Table of Iran’s Drone Fleet

Iran has a large and varied unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arsenal, which it has frequently used in combat. The origins of the Iranian drone programme date to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and it continued to evolve as a key component of Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy in order to compensate for Tehran’s longstanding disadvantage in conventional manned aircraft.

This necessity-driven industry has now proven a valuable asset to Iran in a period in which drones are fast reshaping warfare.

The table below contains information about UAV models in active service that Iran could use to carry out or enable a strike beyond its borders. It includes UAVs whose primary purpose can be classified as one-way attack, reconnaissance, or multipurpose (i.e., a drone capable of performing both strike and reconnaissance functions).

The table also includes information on each UAV model’s armament, range, endurance, flight ceiling, maximum speed, and propulsion system. A drone’s armament and range determine what types of strikes it can carry out and what targets it can reach; its endurance indicates how long it can surveil an area or lie in wait for a target.

The speed and flight ceiling of a drone factor into how best to defend against it: slow-moving, low-flying drones can be shot down with machine guns, for example, while faster and higher ones are more likely to require surface-to-air missiles or interceptor drones. A drone’s propulsion system—its engine—is one of its most important components, and the types of engines Iran uses has implications for export controls meant to constrain its drone programme.

A trio of state-owned entities are responsible for manufacturing most of Iran’s major military drone systems. Shahed Aviation Industries, which is tied to the IRGC Aerospace Force’s Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization, is the producer of Shahed-series UAVs. Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), manufactures the Ababil series of drones, while another MODAFL subsidiary,  Qods Aviation Industries (QAI), produces the Mohajer series. These state entities are supported by a broad and fluid network of private firms that are involved in designing, producing, and procuring UAV components.

Iran has proliferated many of its drone models to its allies and proxies. For instance, the Shahed-136 drone is used by Russia with the name Geran-2 and by the Houthis with the name Waid-2. Other Iranian drone models have been shared with governments or armed groups in countries including Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, and Venezuela. In some cases, recipients such as Russia have modified the original Iranian designs. In this table, only the nomenclatures and capabilities of the Iranian versions are provided.

The table excludes drones that have a range of 100 kilometers or less, which is the approximate distance between Iran and the United Arab Emirates across the western entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.[1] As a result, first-person view (FPV) drones and fiber-optic drones are not included.[2] The table also excludes interceptor drones, decoy drones, and logistical drones, as well as seaborne unmanned systems, which have not yet been extensively deployed by Iran.

In addition, most of Iran’s one-way attack drones to date are pre-programmed before flight to strike a fixed target, so this table does not classify them as loitering munitions. However, there is evidence that Iran has been experimenting with ways to convert these drones into loitering munitions by enabling them to acquire targets while airborne.[3]

The table draws its information from open sources, primarily U.S. government publications, state-sponsored Iranian media, and official assessments from Israel and Ukraine (the latter for Iranian UAVs used by Russia), as well as analysis from independent researchers and investigative media reports. Information provided for drone models marked with an asterisk (*) has been drawn entirely from Iranian sources.

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Source: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms ControlIran Watch

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