A day after the announcement of the downing of a RQ-170 in Iran, the Public Intelligence website received an FOUO report entitled “Operating Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare” published in April 2011 by the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
One of the many issues that the panel was asked to investigate was electronic threats. Its related finding – “Limited communications systems result in communications latency, link vulnerabilities, and lost-link events.” Section 2.4.3 “Threat to Communication Links” expands on the state of vulnerabilities present for RPAs:
- Jamming of commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) links is a widely available technology. It can provide an effective tool for adversaries against data links or as a way for command and control (C2) denial.
- Operational needs may require the use of unencrypted data links to provide broadcast services to ground troops without security clearances. Eavesdropping on these links is a known exploit that is available to adversaries for extremely low cost.
- Spoofing or hijacking links can lead to damaging missions, or even to platform loss.
Section 2.4.4 “Threat to Position, Navigation, and Guidance”:
- Small, simple GPS noise jammers can be easily constructed and employed by an unsophisticated adversary and would be effective over a limited RPA operating area.
- GPS repeaters are also available for corrupting navigation capabilities of RPAs.
- Cyber threats represent a major challenge for future RPA operations. Cyber attacks can affect both on-board and ground systems, and exploits may range from asymmetric CNO attacks to highly sophisticated electronic systems and software attacks.
These are just a few of the key findings that impact the mission of RPAs. With this report as background, the capture of the RQ-170 by Iranian forces needs to be evaluated fairly and not dismissed as some kind of Iranian scam for reasons that have more to do with embarrassment than a rational assessment of the facts.
Source: Digital DAO